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BEYOND ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES:
TOWARD A MODEL FEDERAL
CORPORATE CRIMINAL CODE
LEONARD ORLAND*
A rational sentencing system presupposes a rational system of criminal
law. While refusing, after years of debate and study, to enact a federal
penal code,1 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,2
which is essentially the sentencing provisions of the draft federal penal
code. By putting the sentencing cart before the penal horse, Congress
functionally isolated the sentencing scheme from an organized system of
substantive law and made the Herculean task of organizing a fair guide-
lines system virtually impossible. Judge (and Commissioner) Steven
Breyer has documented the difficulty the United States Sentencing Com-
mission (the "Commission") faced in creating guidelines in a legislative
vacuum, without the benefit of a substantive code.3 Despite the diffi-
* Professor of Law; University of Connecticut School of Law. Copyright@ 1993 by Leonard
Orland. All rights reserved.
1. In 1975, the first Senate bill was introduced in the 93d Congress as S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). In ensuing congressional sessions, "children" of S. I were introduced and, in the 95th Con-
gress, the "grandson" of S. 1, then designated as S. 1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1977), passed the
Senate by a vote of 72 to 15, 124 CONG. REc. 1463 (1978), but failed in the House, H. REP. No. 29,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). "In the 1980s the steam went out of efforts to adopt a comprehensive
criminal code." NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 67 (1986). For a brief history of the
failure of federal criminal law reform in the 1970s, from the perspective of the Reporter of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, see Louis B. Schwartz, Criminal Law
Reform: Current Issues in the United States, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUsT. 513, 515 (1983);
Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws" Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1977). The failure of codification from the perspective of the Justice Depart-
ment is recounted in Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code
Reform, I CRIM. L.F. 99 (1989).
2. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-413, 98 Stat. 1987 (1985).
Despite its title, that statute was not "a comprehensive criminal law reform or codification statute."
ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 67.
3. Stephen Breyer, The Sentencing Guidelines and Substantive Criminal Code Revision (Jan.
24, 1990) (paper presented to the Society for Reform of the Criminal Law, on file with the author).
Recounting the substantial problems the Commission faced in its efforts to draft guidelines for indi-
viduals in the absence of substantive codification, Judge Breyer concluded:
Prior legislative enactment of substantive criminal law would have helped the Commission
in several ways. First, it would have provided an acceptable framework against which to
measure appropriate punishment for particular kinds of criminal behavior.... Second, it
would have helped to indicate the importance (or lack of importance) of particular aggra-
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culty, all but the harshest of critics4 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines for organizations (the "Sentencing Guidelines" or the
"Guidelines") would have to admit that the Commission made some or-
der out of the chaotic morass of existing federal penal law.
The difficulties that the Commission initially faced with the individual
guidelines were relatively minor compared to the problems the Commis-
sion encountered several years later when it fashioned guidelines for cor-
porate crime.5 Here, in addition to a lack of substantive provisions, the
Commission encountered an absence of general statutory provisions es-
tablishing corporate criminal liability,6 and a congressional failure to
consider systematically corporate aggravants, mitigants,7 or sanctions. 8
These statutory failures led the Commission to devise corporate sentenc-
ing policy which is legislative in nature and resulted in organizational
guidelines with virtually no statutory basis. The result is legislation by
commission edict.9
vating or mitigating features potentially present when offenders commit particular crimes.
Third, it would have made certain aggravating features elements of specific crimes, thereby
providing procedural safeguards for those accused of having engaged in them ...
[P]erhaps most important, it would have diminished the areas of disagreement among
Commissioners and thereby made some of the Commission's decisions politically more
acceptable.
Id. at 56.
4. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without... :Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1993).
5. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8 (1992) [herein-
after U.S.S.G.].
6. Part of the effort at comprehensive criminal law codification included the drafting of statu-
tory principles of corporate criminal liability, but that effort failed with the rejection of S. 1437 in the
95th Congress. See supra note I (discussing legislative history of S. 1437). In the United States,
corporate criminal liability derives from a series of Supreme Court cases beginning with N.Y. Cent.
& Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (upholding constitutionality of Elkins
Act). The federal case law standard of vicarious corporate criminal liability has had a substantial
impact on the states. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability Under the
Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988). See generally Jenifer Moore, Culpability Under
Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 743 (1992); JED RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE GUIDELINES
(1993).
7. The absence of clear statutory aggravants and mitigants, in other contexts, may invalidate a
sanctioning system as unconstitutional. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discre-
tionary capital punishment, without clear aggravants and mitigants, held unconstitutional) with
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital punishment constitutionally permissible if statute
adequately structures aggravants and mitigants).
8. The Sentencing Reform Act does contain provisions which make the sanction of fines, pro-
bation, criminal forfeiture, notice to victims and restitution applicable to organizations. See 18
U.S.C. § 3551(c) (1985).
9. Professor Parker makes a broader attack on the Commission's corporate Guidelines:
"[Tihe Sentencing Guidelines are... rules ... without any rational basis in coherent sentencing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/5
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In the absence of statutory authorization, for example, the Guidelines
authorize confiscatory fines for "criminal purpose organizations." 10 Per-
haps it is desirable and constitutional to define a "criminal purpose or-
ganization" and to confiscate the assets of such an organization when it is
convicted of crime, but certainly Congress, not the Commission, should
decide." Again, in the absence of a statutory direction to do so, the
Commission adopted a single fine policy for all organizations, large and
small, profit and not-for-profit, and grouped these organizations with un-
ions, pension funds, governments and political subdivisions. 12 I disagree
with Commissioner Nagel's conclusion that the Commission's treatment
of fines established a "theoretical foundation of consistency." 13 The
Commission not only acted without a statutory mandate, but in the pro-
cess it "treat[ed] unequals equally," and "created inequality." 14
Finally, the Guidelines' provisions on fines array thirty-two gradations
of fines ranging from $5000 to $72,500,000.15 The enhancements and
reductions in this thirty-two level gradation scheme, in form and func-
tion, constitute a series of complicated aggravants and mitigants. The
policy for their core structure; without statutory authority for many of their key features; and with-
out constitutional validity to some of their more startling innovations." Parker, supra note 4, at 399.
10. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 8C1.1.
11. Professor Parker charges that
the Commission's legislation of a "death penalty" for what it calls a "criminal purpose
organization" . . . present a virtual encyclopedia of methods of government overreaching
... [and] is inconsistent with the Sentencing Reform Act and unconstitutional .... [There
is no statutory authority for this provision, and considerable evidence of legislative intent
to the contrary.
Parker, supra note 4, at 434-35.
12. Id. § 8A1.1 (comment. (n.1)).
13. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop W. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines For Corpora-
tions" Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 248-49. Explaining this rationale, Nagel and Swenson conclude:
As a general proposition, size does not directly bear on the computation of a corporation's
fine. The same rules apply whether the convicted company is a "Fortune Fifty" manufac-
turing conglomerate or a "mom and pop" dry cleaner. The way in which the seriousness
of the offense is computed is not fundamentally influenced by size. Indeed, the Commis-
sion ultimately saw no logical way of proceeding other than measuring offense seriousness
consistently. Any other approach would "capriciously overdeter[] and underdeter[ ] of-
fenses by giving the less wealthy [organizations] incentives to commit more harmful of-
fenses, and vice versa."
Id. at 249.
14. Leonard Orland, Corporate Punishment by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 4 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 50, 51. Professor Schulhofer sees a similar problem in the Com-
mission's treatment of individuals: "we now have a serious problem of unwarranted similarity in the
treatment of substantially distinguishable cases." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Excessive Uniformity and
How to Fix It, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 169.
15. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 8C2.4.
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Commission devised this scheme once again acting without statutory
support. Perhaps the presence of an effective corporate compliance pro-
gram should mitigate a sentence, and the involvement of senior manage-
ment should aggravate a sentence, as the Commission has decided, but
Congress should decide these and other policy choices, not the
Commission.
In an effort to stimulate discussion on the policy choices that Congress
should have (but has not) made concerning corporate crime, and in an
effort to underscore how deeply the Guidelines arrogate to the Commis-
sion basic policy matters that are more properly within the business of
Congress, I propose a Model Federal Corporate Criminal Code (the
"Model Code"). This Code is designed to function either independently
of, or in conjunction with, a sentencing commission and is based on a
number of explicit policy preferences.
L Scope
As a general rule, in most industrialized nations, corporations are le-
gally incapable of violating the criminal law.16 The unique American
rule of corporate criminal liability has as its theoretical base the notion
that large profit-making organizations should not be permitted to profit
from wrongdoing with immunity from criminal sanction, and that it is
proper to hold the organization liable for what is, after all, organizational
behavior.17 Large publicly held, profit-making corporations fit within
this model of organizational liability. Professor Brickey makes a power-
ful argument that large closely held profit-making corporations also fit
the organizational liability model."8 It is less clear that smaller partner-
16. See Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholar-
ship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501 (1980).
17. Id.
18. I quite agree with Professor Brickey's conclusions:
The premise that close corporations act more like individuals than organizations clearly
applies to ... [a] one person corporation.... But as the number of individuals involved in
the venture, the complexity of its organization and operations, and the volume of business
conducted in its name all increase, the characteristics that made its behavior analogous to
individual behavior ultimately disappear... organizations that employ tens of thousands
(or perhaps just thousands) of workers are bound to have layers of bureaucracy character-
istic of large publicly held corporations .... [Tlhese close corporations function much like
their large, publicly held counterparts .... The reasons that support recognition of corpo-
rate criminal liability are wholly unrelated to the question of who owns the corporation.
They are tied, instead, to the bureaucracy that makes personal accountability less likely.
That bureaucracy will exist in large corporations whether they are publicly or closely held.
Kathleen F. Brickey, Close Corporations and the Criminal Law: On "Mom and Pop" and a Curious
Rule, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 189, 195 (1993).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/5
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ships, closely held corporations, non-profit organizations, pension funds,
and unions fit the organizational liability model; as a matter of organiza-
tional theory, many of these smaller entities behave more like individuals
than organizations. 19 For this reason, the Model Penal Code applies
only to large corporations, whether publicly or privately held,'0 and
utilizes a line of demarcation regarding the meaning of "large" drawn
from commonly accepted distinctions in the law of corporate
governance.
2. Principles of Corporate Criminal Liability
There is no existing federal statute which establishes general principles
of corporate criminal liability. Professor Bucy argues that the current
federal case law standard for corporate criminal liability is "not jurispru-
dentially sound" because it does not "require proof of intent as a prereq-
uisite for corporate criminal liability."21 I disagree, and the Model Code
rests on the belief that the current federal case law standards are sound
but would benefit from statutory elaboration. In S. 1,22 and later in S.
1437,23 the Senate articulated a statutory basis for corporate criminal lia-
bility that was intended, for the most part, to restate preexisting law.
The Model Code adopts these formulations, along with a provision (also
derived from S. 1437) which creates a new crime of reckless failure to
supervise a corporate employee.
3. Elimination of Corporate Probation and Creation of New
Presumptive Sanctions
The Sentencing Guidelines reflect multiple failures in the treatment of
sanctions, including a failure to consider new corporate intermediate
sanctions and a failure to escape preoccupation with fines. Furthermore,
reliance on corporate probation, which the courts have addressed with
19. Barry D. Baysinger, Organizational Theory and the Criminal Liability of Corporations, 71
B.U. L. REv. 341 (1991).
20. My original draft had applied only to publicly held corporations. Having had the benefit of
Professor Brickey's analysis of large closely held corporations, I modified the draft so that liability
would not turn on the pattern of ownership.
21. Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines The Cart Before the Horse, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 329 (1993). See also Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard For Impos-
ing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095 (1991).
22. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
23. S. 1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1977).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
362 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 71:357
some difficulty and hostility,2 4 carries with it the self-evident problem of
a lack of effective sanction in the event of corporate probation violation.25
The Commission has ignored this problem.26 In the process, the Com-
mission has virtually ignored some of the fresh approaches articulated by
the American Bar Association (ABA) in its most recent Standards for
Sentencing and Sentencing Alternatives.27 The Commission has also
overlooked the emerging penological literature on the importance of in-
termediate sanctions in a rational sentencing scheme.2"
The Model Code proceeds on the assumption that it is preferable and
more appropriate to array a range of intermediate sanctions to corporate
crime than a simplistic, sharply graded fine grid. Thus, utilizing the
ABA Standards, the Model Code proposes that sentencing courts impose
mandatory sentences of acknowledgement of wrongdoing29 and compli-
24. See John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Standards for Organizational Probation: A Proposal for the
United States Sentencing Commission, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 77 (1988). Professor Gruner accu-
rately summarizes the advantages of corporate probation as well as "some of the problems attendant
to using corporate probation as a sentencing tool." Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative
Corporate Sentences Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 302 (1993).
25. Professor Gruner, in my judgment, overestimates the availability of corporate probation
violation sanctions when he concludes:
A variety of sanctions can be imposed for probation violations. A corporate probationer
found to have violated a term of probation can either be continued on probation under
enhanced probation terms or have its probation revoked and be resentenced to any sanc-
tion that was available at its original sentencing. Individuals having notice of a sentencing
court's order imposing probation terms who (1) willfully violate these terms, (2) prevent,
obstruct, impede, or interfere with compliance with these terms by others, or (3) intention-
ally hinder or delay the communication of any, probation violation to a court or probation
officer, will be subject to contempt sanctions and individual criminal liability.
Gruner, supra note 24, at 301. The two statutes referred to by Professor Gruner, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1509
and 1512, do not deal with probation, let alone corporate probation; § 1509, the general obstruction
of court order statute and § 1512, the general witness tampering statute, have never, to my knowl-
edge, been applied to individuals in a corporate probation violation setting. I think it unlikely that
they ever would.
26. See Orland, supra note 14, at 50.
27. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCE-
DURES (3d ed. 1993).
28. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTER-
MEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990). The Commission's failure
to address intermediate sanctions is also a glaring defect of the individual guidelines. See Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1706 (1992). Professor Gruner makes a convincing case for the use
of intermediate sanctions under the Guidelines for organizations; I think his objectives can be better
realized under the Model Code, which utilizes intermediate sanctions as free standing judicial orders
not tied to corporate probation.
29. See generally BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON COR-
PORATE OFFENDERS (1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/5
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ance programs and discretionary sentences of community service and no-
tice to victims3° for all felony convictions of publicly held companies.
These sanctions would serve as free-standing judicial orders in a criminal
case, independent of probation, and would be fully capable of enforce-
ment by the contempt sanction.
4. Gradation
Congressional failure to enact a federal criminal code has perpetuated
an array of federal criminal statutes enacted over the course of a century.
These criminal statutes fail to differentiate properly among crimes. The
Sentencing Guidelines finesse the problem of gradation by engrafting the
gradation of seriousness of individual offenses from the individual guide-
lines onto the organizational guidelines. The Commission fails to articu-
late a justification for this problematic approach.3
The need for gradation in a criminal code is tied to sanctions.32 For
example, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code adopted fel-
ony categories that relate to the length of prison time-the higher the
degree of the felony, the higher the authorized maximum term of impris-
onment. In contrast, there is no imprisonment in corporate sanctioning,
30. See generally Brent Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981
Wis. L. Rnv. 970, 978-80.
31. Professor Parker describes the shortcomings of the offense level structure of the individual
guidelines and their impact on the organizational guidelines in these terms:
The precise numbers assigned to the offense levels, and the rate of change between the
numbers was chosen arbitrarily.... [I]n addition, the original offense level structure never
was and cannot be a scale of "seriousness," because it was developed from entirely different
considerations for entirely different purposes.
In fact, the offense level structure of the original guidelines is purely an artifact of the
empirical apporach used to develop those guidelines. The original guidelines' offense levels
were, in essence, the coefficients found in multiple regression analysis of past imprisonment
sentences; they are not derived from the "seriousness" of the underlying offense conduct,
but are based upon the unique characteristics of imprisonment as a sanction, and have no
rational application whatever to the determination of fines for organizations. Moreover,
the offense level structure is not an arithmetic scale of any kind, because the underlying
regression analyses were logarithmic.... This is why imprisonment sentences increase by
about twelve percent per offense level. In other words, the sentencing table of the individ-
ual guidelines is, in effect, a compound interest table at a twelve percent interest rate.
Parker, supra note 4, at 405-06.
32. Professor Schwartz notes:
A first step in any reform project is to select a set of categories into which all crimes will be
classified.... The necessity of classifying offenses and matching penalties manifested itself
first in the ancient distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.... A major task for
the reformer is to select the appropriate ladder of punishment to correspond with the clas-
sification system.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 518-19.
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only fines and probation. The problems with imposing only fines is that
their impact is mostly felt by innocent stockholders.33 The problem with
corporate probation is that a court has no effective threat available if a
corporation violates a probation order.34 In part for these reasons, the
Model Code eliminates corporate probation and reduces the traditional
paramount importance of the fine, characterized by Commissioner Nagel
as "the centerpiece of the Sentencing Guidelines structure. ' 35 This ap-
proach reduces the need for Congress to undertake the difficult task of
redefining and grading all felonies.
5. Aggravants and Mitigants
The absence of statutory aggravants and mitigants led the Commission
to devise its own factors in the Sentencing Guidelines without statutory
guidance. This approach is troublesome, not because of the Commis-
sion's particular policy choices, but because the Commission was unwill-
ing to recognize that the Guidelines rest on important policy
determinations that Congress has not made. The Model Code articulates
aggravants and mitigants applicable to corporate conduct in order to fo-
cus upon the underlying policy issues and to permit discussion in the
broader context of the legitimacy of the corporate aggravation and miti-
gation scheme. Many of the Model Code's aggravants and mitigants
were derived in large part from the Commission's Guidelines.
6. Ancillary Provisions
At the present time, no centralized repository for information on cor-
porate criminal convictions exists.36 Thus, while corporate conviction
records play a critically important role in calculating fine levels under the
Commission's Guidelines, probation officers must gather this vital infor-
mation either from the offender or from public sources. 37 To remedy this
problem of a lack of centralized information, the Model Code requires
corporations to report criminal convictions to the Securities and Ex-
33. See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Be-
havior, 71 B.U. L. REv. 395 (1991).
34. Orland, supra note 14, at 50. See generally Gruner, supra note 24, at 304-25 (describing
ways a sentencing court could resentence a convicted corporation which violated probation
conditions).
35. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 13, at 210.
36. Orland, supra note 16, at 509.
37. See PRESENTENCE REPORT FOR AN ORGANIZATION: A RESOURCE GUIDE, ADMINISTRA-
iVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS (Feb. 1992).
[Vol. 71:357
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change Commission. In addition, the Model Code directs the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to maintain centralized criminal records on cor-
porate offenders.
CONCLUSION
Conventional law review scholarship consists of exposition and foot-
notes not statutory drafts; but I believe that one can best understand the
virtues of codification of corporate sanctions by the articulation and ex-
amination of a Model Code. This Article presents such a code below, in
an effort to "produce some order in an area which has developed in a
rather disorderly way, and to state some general principles around which
a rational formulation can be constructed. ' 38 Perhaps the Model Code
might also interest Congress and the Clinton administration as they be-
gin to grapple with problems of criminal law reform.
MODEL FEDERAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL
CODE
CHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 1 Definitions and Applicability
(a) Definition of Corporation: As used herein, "corporation" means
an entity created under the corporation laws of a state that as of the
record date for its annual shareholders' meeting when the offense oc-
curred had at least $5 million or more of total assets.
[Derivation: American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance § 1.31-4 (Proposed Final Draft 1992), which, in turn, is derived
from Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), Rule 12g-1 under that Act, and
Federal Securities Code § 402(a).]
(b) Applicability: This statute is applicable only to the sentencing of
corporations, as defined in subsection (a), for crimes classified as felonies
under federal law.
38. Brickey, supra note 6, at 629 (quoting The American Law Institute Proceedings, 33d An-
nual Meeting, 172 (1956)) (discussion of Model Penal Code provisions on corporate criminal
liability).
19931
Washington University Open Scholarship
